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Note 
REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA:   
PROMOTING PATIENT AUTONOMY TO CHOOSE 
AVASTIN AND OTHER CANCER DRUGS 
SARA J. RAY 
On November 18, 2011, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
revoked accelerated approval of the breast cancer indication for Avastin, a 
cancer drug manufactured by Genentech.  The FDA claims that Avastin, 
when used to treat metastatic breast cancer, does not provide a benefit that 
justifies the serious and potentially life-threatening risks associated with 
its use.  The agency concluded that there was insufficient evidence that 
Avastin would help women with breast cancer live longer or improve their 
quality of life.  This decision has sparked controversy and debate among 
women who want to keep Avastin available as an option to treat their 
breast cancer and view this decision as a death sentence.   
This Note discusses the importance of keeping Avastin available as a 
treatment option for women with metastatic breast cancer and the 
propriety of the FDA’s authority to remove approval of its use in the 
treatment of this life-threatening disease.  In this Note, I will argue that 
there are wide-ranging problems resulting from the current system in 
which the FDA is able to regulate serious cancer drugs like Avastin.  I 
further argue that these problems demonstrate that the FDA should no 
longer be the sole regulatory authority for cancer drugs like Avastin and 
propose an alternative system of regulation that is better aligned with the 
principle of patient autonomy. 
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REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA:   
PROMOTING PATIENT AUTONOMY TO CHOOSE 
AVASTIN AND OTHER CANCER DRUGS 
SARA J. RAY

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American Cancer Society has estimated that this year in the 
United States about 226,870 new cases of invasive breast cancer will be 
diagnosed in women, 63,300 new cases of carcinoma in situ (the earliest 
form of breast cancer) will be diagnosed, and 39,510 women will die from 
breast cancer.
1
  Excluding skin cancers, “[b]reast cancer is the most 
common cancer among American women,” with a woman having slightly 
less than a one-in-eight chance of developing invasive breast cancer during 
her lifetime.
2
  With breast cancer being the second leading cause of cancer 
death in women, breast cancer holds a prominent place in public health 
with a national focus on early detection initiatives, increasing awareness, 
and improving treatment.
3
 
In addition to providing general information about breast cancer, the 
American Cancer Society provides information on treatment options based 
on the opinions and professional experience of the doctors and nurses 
serving on its Editorial Board.
4
  Among some of the available treatments 
are surgery, radiation therapy, chemotherapy, hormone therapy, and 
targeted therapy.
5
  Many Americans are familiar with radiation and 
chemotherapy as cancer treatment options, but “[a]s researchers have 
learned more about the gene changes in cells that cause cancer, they have 
been able to develop newer drugs that specifically target these changes.  
These targeted drugs work differently from standard chemotherapy  
                                                                                                                          
 Providence College, B.A., cum laude, 2009; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 
Candidate 2013.  I am thankful to my advisor, Professor Robert Whitman, for reviewing this Note and 
providing thoughtful comments and feedback.  I am also grateful to my colleagues from the 
Connecticut Law Review for their contribution.  A special thanks to my family and Christopher 
Stankus for their continued support and encouragement.  
1
 Breast Cancer: What Is Breast Cancer? Topics: What Are the Key Statistics About Breast 
Cancer?, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breast-
cancer-key-statistics (last visited July 21, 2012). 
2 Id. 
3 See id. (discussing decreasing fatality rates from breast cancer since 1990). 
4
 Breast Cancer: Treating Breast Cancer Topics: How is Breast Cancer Treated?, AM. CANCER 
SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breast-cancer-treating-general-info 
(last visited July 21, 2012). 
5 Id. 
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drugs . . . [and] are most often used along with chemotherapy.”6  Although 
targeted drugs are a more recent development, targeted therapy is an 
attractive treatment option available to those threatened with more serious 
and advanced cases of breast cancer. 
One such targeted therapy treatment for advanced breast cancer is 
Bevacizumab, more commonly known as Avastin.
7
  Avastin, produced by 
the pharmaceutical company Genentech, “first received accelerated 
approval by the [FDA]” in 2008 to treat metastatic breast cancer.8  The 
data backing the FDA’s approval for the drug indicated that combining 
Avastin with chemotherapy extended the time it took for the disease to 
progress when compared to chemotherapy treatments alone.
9
  “As part of 
the accelerated approval process, Genentech agreed to conduct further 
studies” of the drug to determine whether women taking Avastin indeed 
lived longer as a result.
10
 
Although Genentech’s research and development of Avastin to treat 
metastatic breast cancer has been ongoing, an advisory committee to the 
FDA voted unanimously to remove approval of Avastin for this indication 
because recent studies did not show the drug to be safe and effective.
11
  
The 6-0 vote caused the FDA to rescind its approval,
12
 which was granted 
“under a system” allowing for promising drugs that treat serious diseases 
“to [reach the] market more rapidly,” subject to further studies.13  Even 
though the approval of Avastin for breast cancer has been rescinded, the 
drug can still be prescribed “off-label” to treat breast cancer.  Insurers, 
however, are now less likely to pay for the drug, “which can cost $88,000 a 
                                                                                                                          
6 Breast Cancer: Treating Breast Cancer Topics: Breast Cancer Targeted Therapy, AM. CANCER 
SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breast-cancer-treating-targeted-
therapy (last visited July 21, 2012). 
7 Id. 
8 Rebecca V. Snowden, FDA Advisory Panel Votes Against Avastin for Advanced Breast Cancer, 
AM. CANCER SOC’Y (July 20, 2010), http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/news/News/fda-advisory-panel-
votes-against-avastin-for-advanced-breast-cancer. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.; see also Hal Barron, Letter to the Editor, Judging a Cancer Drug: Avastin’s Story, 
NYTIMES.COM, (June 1, 2011), http:www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/opinion/102avastin.html (“We 
continue to study Avastin . . . [and] believe that women who are trying to control their disease should 
retain the autonomy to decide, based on the facts, whether Avastin is right for them.”).  Hal Barron is 
the chief medical officer and head of global product development for Genentech.  Id. 
11 Andrew Pollock, F.D.A. Panel Rejects Use of Avastin for Breast Cancer, NYTIMES.COM (June 
29, 2011), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/f-d-a-panel-still-sees-no-benefit-of-
avastin-for-breast-cancer/?scp=1&sq=f.d.a.%20panel%20rejects%20use%20of%20avastin&st=cse 
[hereinafter F.D.A. Panel Rejects Use of Avastin for Breast Cancer]. 
12 U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Commissioner Statement: FDA Commissioner Removes 
Breast Cancer Indication from Avastin Label (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www/fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsr
oom/PressAnnouncements/ucm279485.htm [hereinafter Commissioner Statement]. 
13 Andrew Pollock, Breast Cancer Patients Plead for Avastin Approval, NYTIMES.COM, (June 28, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/business/29drug.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=breast%20cancer
%20patients%20plead&st=cse [hereinafter Breast Cancer Patients Plead for Avastin Approval]. 
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year” for one patient.14  Many claim that this decision effectively results in 
a death sentence for women with metastatic breast cancer who “want every 
available weapon in [their] arsenal as [they] fight this devastating 
disease.”15 
This Note discusses the importance of keeping Avastin available as a 
treatment option for women with metastatic breast cancer and the propriety 
of the FDA’s ability to remove approval for its use in the treatment of this 
life-threatening disease.  It presents the wide-ranging problems that are 
raised by the current system of FDA regulation of serious cancer drugs like 
Avastin.  It argues that these problems demonstrate that the FDA should no 
longer be the sole regulatory agency for cancer drugs like Avastin and 
proposes an alternative system of regulation that is more in line with 
American values, while preserving the legitimate purposes and goals of the 
FDA. 
Part II discusses the history of Avastin in the marketplace and the 
authority of the FDA to regulate cancer treatments as a means of 
promoting public health.  This Part looks at the development, approval, and 
regulation of Avastin for treatment of metastatic breast cancer, the current 
state of Avastin following the FDA’s decision, and the significant effects 
that removing FDA approval for Avastin has on women with metastatic 
breast cancer.  This Part also introduces the current problems and debates 
in this area. 
Part III analyzes the wide-ranging problems that are raised by FDA 
regulation of cancer treatments like Avastin.  This Part begins by looking 
at the significant burdens placed on individual patient autonomy in 
choosing effective forms of treatment under the guidance of a physician.  
Second, this Part discusses how FDA regulations have raised political 
debate in health care reform by those claiming the government is engaging 
in health care rationing when it denies expensive medical treatments to 
individuals.  Lastly, this Part shows how the FDA’s decision increases the 
costs of drug development, slows down the rate of adopting effective new 
uses of cancer drugs for serious diseases, and limits the ability of 
prescribing physicians to receive useful medical information from drug 
developers.  This Part concludes that these problems collectively 
demonstrate that the FDA is not the proper body to regulate Avastin and 
should no longer have the sole authority to regulate this type of drug. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the existing system for Avastin and other 
cancer treatments should be modified.  This Part focuses on the purposes 
of the FDA to demonstrate that while the FDA may be well-suited to 
regulate cosmetic drugs, its purposes are frustrated when it regulates 
                                                                                                                          
14 F.D.A. Panel Rejects Use of Avastin for Breast Cancer, supra note 11. 
15 Breast Cancer Patients Plead for Avastin Approval, supra note 13 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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cancer drugs like Avastin.  Therefore, an alternative system should be 
implemented.  This Part presents three alternatives that could follow the 
implementation of relaxed licensing requirements: (1) reassigning the 
regulatory role to patients and physicians through the process of shared 
decision making; (2) regulating through voluntary private organizations; 
and (3) permitting insurance payors to take charge of regulating once 
Avastin passes initial threshold approval from the FDA.  This Part 
concludes that these proposals better serve the purposes of public health 
and thus one of them should be adopted.  
This Note concludes that there should be a new scheme enacted to 
regulate cancer drugs like Avastin after they satisfy initial threshold 
licensing approval by the FDA. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF AVASTIN AND FDA REGULATION 
A.  The Development of Avastin for Treatment of Breast Cancer 
The pharmaceutical company Genentech developed the drug Avastin 
to treat individuals with metastatic cancers.  Avastin is currently approved 
to treat metastatic colorectal cancer, advanced nonsquamous non-small cell 
lung cancer, glioblastoma, and metastatic kidney cancer.
16
  Avastin is not 
chemotherapy, but is a “tumor-starving therapy” designed to control cancer 
longer than with chemotherapy alone by prohibiting blood vessels from 
accessing a cancer tumor, making the tumor shrink, and keeping it from 
spreading.
17
  Studies have shown that compared with chemotherapy alone, 
people taking Avastin with chemotherapy are more likely to “[h]ave their 
tumors shrink[,] [k]eep their cancer controlled longer[,] [and] [l]ive 
longer.”18  Additionally, “[t]he most common side effects of Avastin are: 
nosebleeds, headache, high blood pressure, inflammation of the nose, too 
much protein in the urine, taste change, dry skin, rectal bleeding, tear 
production disorder, back pain, and inflammation of the skin.”19 
The FDA approved Avastin for the treatment of metastatic breast 
cancer in 2008 based on a study in which the women who took Avastin 
along with chemotherapy experienced a longer duration of stalled cancer 
                                                                                                                          
16 AVASTIN: WHAT DOES AVASTIN TREAT?, http://www.avastin.com/patient/index.html (last 
visited July 21, 2012). 
17 GENENTECH, AVASTIN: GETTING STARTED WITH AVASTIN, 
http://www.avastin.com/concatenate/Avastin_Patient_TearPad.pdf?srcUrl=http://prod.avastin.gene.s3.a
mazonaws.com/patient/pdf/20120220/Avastin-Getting-
Started.pdf&srcUrl=http://www.gene.com/gene/products/information/pdf/avastin-prescribing.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
18 Id. 
19 AVASTIN: WHAT DOES AVASTIN TREAT?, supra note 16.  More serious side effects include 
gastrointestinal perforation, slow or incomplete wound healing, and serious (sometimes fatal) bleeding. 
Id. 
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growth than women who underwent chemotherapy treatment alone.
20
  In 
July 2010, new study results were presented that did not show the same 
benefit for women who took Avastin to treat their cancer.
21
  The FDA 
concluded from these results that the risks of the drug outweighed the 
benefits in the treatment of metastatic breast cancer and, on December 16, 
2010, announced a plan to remove the breast cancer indication for 
Avastin.
22
  Genentech responded by calling for a hearing on the FDA’s 
conclusion before the FDA Commissioner, Margaret Hamburg, was to 
issue a final decision.
23
  Rescission of FDA approval means that Genentech 
can no longer market Avastin for breast cancer by telling physicians or 
patients that the drug may help treat breast cancer, but Avastin will still be 
available in the drug market to treat indications for which it remains 
approved, such as lung and colon cancers.
24
  Oncologists will still be able 
to prescribe Avastin to treat breast cancer on an “off-label” basis.  
Insurance companies, however, are less likely to cover this type of use, 
thereby escalating the cost of Avastin to around $88,000 a year for a 
typical breast cancer patient.
25
  There are many who fear that this decision 
will greatly hinder the individual’s access to treatment.26 
                                                                                                                          
20 Snowden, supra note 8. 
21 U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., FDA News Release: FDA Begins Process to Remove 
Breast Cancer Indication from Avastin Label (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsr
oom/PressAnnouncements/2010/ucm237172.htm.  The study showed that although Avastin seemed to 
slow cancer growth for some of the women, it did not help them live longer and they had much more 
severe side effects.  Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Commissioner Statement, supra note 12. 
24 Snowden, supra note 8.  The deputy chief medical officer of the American Cancer Society, Len 
Lichtenfeld, MD, recommended women currently taking Avastin to talk to their oncologists about what 
course of action to take pending the decision from the FDA.  He noted “[t]hese studies and 
recommendations do not have any impact on the use of [Avastin] in the treatment of other forms of 
cancer where the FDA has given approval, such as colon cancer and lung cancer . . . .  This review 
applies only to the specific recommendation regarding the use of [Avastin] in the treatment of recurrent 
breast cancer.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Plans to Revoke Approval for Breast Cancer Drug, NY TIMES: 
PRESCRIPTIONS, (Dec. 16, 2010), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/f-d-a-revokes-
approval-for-breast-cancer-drug [hereinafter F.D.A. Plans]; see also Letter from Hal Barron, Chief 
Medical Officer and Head, Global Product Development, Genentech to Avastin Patient (Nov. 18, 
2011), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/products/information/pdf/avastin_informationforpatient
s.pdf (informing patients that “[t]he FDA’s withdrawal of approval means that some insurers may no 
longer pay for Avastin for breast cancer”). 
26 See, e.g., Jason Millman, Following Avastin Decision, Republicans Say FDA Rationing Care, 
THE HILL: HEALTHWATCH (Dec. 16, 2010, 6:06 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medical-
devices-and-prescription-drug-policy-/134131-following-avastin-decision-republicans-say-fda-
rationing-care- (sharing breast cancer advocate Susan G. Komen for the Cure’s desire “to be sure that 
women who are using Avastin, and for whom it is working, can continue to have access to it, that their 
insurers will continue to pay for it and that the drug’s manufacturer, Genentech/Roche, continues 
making the drug available to women through its patient support programs” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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It is a rare occurrence for the FDA to remove approval of a drug that 
has received accelerated approval.
27
  By contrast, “[e]uropean authorities 
have not revoked Avastin’s approval for” this indication.28  This decision 
has been controversial as breast cancer patients and patient advocacy 
groups claim that by not keeping the drug approved the FDA “den[ies] 
patients a chance at . . . a life-saving therapy.”29  Genentech appealed to the 
FDA to keep Avastin available as a treatment option, arguing that 
“approval should be retained while [they conducted another] clinical 
trial.”30  The FDA responded that since it had already found that the 
“benefits of [the drug did not] outweigh the risks, retaining the approval” 
during a new study “would not be in the interest of the public health and 
would jeopardize the integrity of the accelerated approval program.”31  
Ultimately, the accelerated approval that had been granted by the FDA for 
the breast cancer indication was revoked by the Commissioner.
32
 
There are advocates on both sides of the Avastin debate.  Some have 
urged the FDA “to revoke the approval to maintain the integrity of the 
accelerated process.”33  On the other hand, there were “[a]bout a dozen 
                                                                                                                          
27 F.D.A. Plans, supra note 25. 
28 Julian Pecquet, FDA Defends Restrictions on Avastin Cancer Drug, THE HILL: HEALTHWATCH 
(Jan. 7, 2011, 12:47 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medical-device-and-prescription-drug-
policy-/136617-fda-defends-restrictions-on-avastin-cancer-drug.  European authorities, however, “have 
recommended restricting” Avastin to be “only used [with one specific] type of chemotherapy, 
paclitaxel.”  Id.; see also Breast Cancer Drug ‘Still Safe’ for Aussie Women, ABC NEWS (July 22, 
2010), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-07-22/breast-cancer-drug-still-safe-for-aussie-women/ 
914514 (noting that Avastin has remained available in Australia and “continues to be an option for 
women” with metastatic breast cancer).  
29 F.D.A. Plans, supra note 25.  Some have called the FDA’s decision “cost control” or 
“rationing” “under the new health care law.”  Id. 
30 Andrew Pollack, Genentech to Appeal to F.D.A. for Breast Cancer Drug, NYTIMES.COM (June 
26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/health/27drug.html [hereinafter Genentech to Appeal] 
(arguing that “[e]ven where [the] F.D.A. determines that confirmatory trials do not establish clinical 
benefit, withdrawal is not required” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
31 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
32 Commissioner Statement, supra note 12.  According to the Commissioner:  “[Avastin] has not 
been shown to provide a benefit, in terms of delay in the growth of tumors, that would justify its 
serious and potentially life-threatening risks.  Nor is there evidence that use of Avastin will either help 
women with breast cancer live longer or improve their quality of life.”  Id.  However, Commissioner 
Hamburg did “encourage Genentech to consider additional studies to identify if there are select 
subgroups of women suffering from breast cancer who might benefit from this drug.”  U.S. Dep’t 
Health & Human Serv., FDA News Release: FDA Commissioner Announces Avastin Decision (Nov. 
18, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm280536.htm (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In fact, Genentech chief medical officer and head of Global Product 
Development, Hal Barron, M.D., said that “[d]espite today’s action, we will start a new Phase III study 
of Avastin in . . . previously untreated metastatic breast cancer and will evaluate a potential biomarker 
that may help identify which people might derive a more substantial benefit from Avastin.”  Genentech, 
FDA Commissioner Announces Final Decision on Avastin for Metastatic Breast Cancer  
(Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/news/press-
releases/display.do?method=print&id=13687 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 Genentech to Appeal, supra note 30.  
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women with breast cancer” who came to Genentech’s hearing in front of 
the FDA to testify that “the [drug] does help some women” and “should 
[remain] available to them.”34  As the New York Times reported: 
“Representatives of advocacy groups for patients with ovarian, kidney and 
colon cancer and melanoma also spoke in favor of retaining the breast 
cancer approval, saying, among other things, that revocation could 
discourage drug development.”35  Some advocates for the drug have called 
the hearing a “death trial, not of Avastin but of [the] women who rely on 
Avastin to stay alive.”36  As one physician noted prior to the decision, 
“[t]he FDA’s decision is not going to be an easy one.  It is our hope they 
will make that decision with full consideration of the science and the 
interests of the public, and the women who have been and will continue to 
be diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer.”37 
In a society where progress in medicine and the development of 
innovative treatments are not just encouraged, but praised, it is hard to 
believe that a promising drug like Avastin has sparked so much debate and 
controversy.  The choice by the FDA to follow the panel’s 
recommendation is a setback for both the development of Avastin and “the 
treatment of advanced metastatic breast cancer.”38  This decision is 
particularly troublesome when one considers the significant effect that 
breast cancer has on women throughout the nation.
39
  The unyielding views 
on both sides of the Avastin debate indicate that there are significant policy 
themes underlying this issue. 
B.  The FDA’s Authority to Regulate 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) of 1938 was a 
“complet[e legislative] overhau[l of] the public health system . . .  
authori[zing] the FDA to demand evidence of safety for new drugs, issue 
standards for food, and conduct factory inspections.”40  The FDCA has a 
substantial impact on food and drug products in the United States today, 
                                                                                                                          
34 Andrew Pollack, Cancer Survivors Appeal to F.D.A. over Avastin, NY TIMES: PRESCRIPTIONS 
(June 28, 2011, 1:27 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/cancer-survivors-appeal-
to-f-d-a-over-avastin. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 Dr. Len, FDA Advisors Vote Unanimously That Avastin Approval Should be Withdrawn, and 
You Could Hear the Pain, AM. CANCER SOC’Y: DR. LEN’S CANCER BLOG (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.cancer.org/AboutUs/DrLensBlog/post/2011/06/29/FDA-Advisors-Vote-Unanimously-
That-Avastin-Approval-Should-Be-Withdrawn-And-You-Could-Hear-The-Pain. 
38 Todd Zwillich, FDA Panel Opposes Avastin for Breast Cancer: Advisory Panel Recommends 
That Avastin be Dropped as a Breast Cancer Drug, WEBMD HEALTH NEWS (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.webmd.com/breast-cancer/news/20110629/fda-panel-opposes-avastin-for-breast-cancer. 
39 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
40 U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Regulatory Information: Legislation, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/default.htm (last visited July 21, 2012). 
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regulating $1 trillion worth of products per year.
41
  Under the authority of 
the Act, the FDA governs how pharmaceutical drugs like Avastin acquire 
approval to be sold and how they are subsequently regulated in the 
marketplace.
42
  The FDCA prohibits the introduction of any new drug into 
interstate commerce unless the drug has been filed with and approved by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
43
 
The Act establishes the power of the FDA
44
 and authorizes the 
Secretary “to conduct examinations and investigations for the purposes of 
[the Act] through officers and employees of the Department.”45  A “drug” 
under the Act is broadly defined as “articles intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body.”46  One who uses drugs 
in violation of the Act is subject to penalties, such as the seizure and 
destruction of the drugs,
47
 injunctions against further use of the drugs,
48
 
fines, or imprisonment.
49
  The FDA has thus been conferred broad 
authority under the FDCA to regulate in this area. 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research (“CDER”) “promotes and protects the health of Americans 
by assuring that all prescription and over-the-counter drugs are safe and 
effective.”50  The CDER has the important task of evaluating all new drugs 
before they enter the market and monitoring more than 10,000 drugs 
currently on the market to make sure they continue to meet high 
standards.
51
  The Center’s evaluations provide doctors and patients with 
information that enables them to use medicines wisely, and the CDER 
continues to develop its drug safety program to ensure that drugs are used 
safely once they are approved.
52
  The Center also ensures that both brand-
name and generic drugs work correctly and that their health benefits 
outweigh their known risks.
53
 
Under the FDCA, a new drug is approved for a specified and intended 
                                                                                                                          
41 Id. 
42 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
43 Id. § 355(a)–(b). 
44 Id. § 393. 
45 Id. § 372. 
46 Id. § 321(g)(1). 
47 Id. § 334. 
48 Id. § 332. 
49 Id. § 333(a)–(b). 
50 DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH: 
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DRUG USE, PUBLICATION NO. FS 01-3 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter 
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DRUG USE] (emphasis omitted). 
51 Id. 
52 U.S. FDA, Drugs: CDER: The Consumer Watchdog for Safe and Effective Drugs, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143462.htm 
(last visited July 21, 2012). 
53 Id. 
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use after a manufacturer provides sufficient evidence that the drug is safe 
and effective for the medical condition prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested on the label.
54
  Drug companies seeking to sell and distribute a 
drug must undergo a rigorous two-step approval process: an Investigational 
New Drug (“IND”) application followed by a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”).55  This process first requires a drug manufacturer to conduct 
investigations on the effect of the drug on animals to discover how the 
drug works and whether it is likely to be safe and effective for humans.
56
  
Once this is shown, the drug can then be tested for safety in human clinical 
trials after the manufacturer submits the IND application.
57
   
Once an IND application is approved, the drug must undergo clinical 
trials.  Tests are performed to establish whether the drug will safely treat a 
disease and whether it will provide health benefits.
58
  Once testing is 
completed, the drug manufacturer may then submit an NDA to introduce a 
new drug product into the U.S. market.
59
 
Drug companies who wish to market, sell, and distribute a drug in the 
United States must “test it and submit evidence [to the CDER] that it is 
safe and effective” for its intended use.60  The Center then employs its own 
team of physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharmacologists, and other 
scientists to review the company’s data and proposed labeling.61  This 
process is designed to be an independent and unbiased review of the test 
data to establish that a drug’s health benefits indeed outweigh its known 
risks; however, the Center does not itself test drugs.
62
  The Center instead 
conducts research into the drug’s quality, safety, and effectiveness before 
permitting testing in humans.  After human testing is completed, if the drug 
meets all of the Center’s standards, it is then approved for marketing, sale, 
and distribution in the United States, subject to the Center’s determination 
about what the label should say about directions for use, side effects, and 
                                                                                                                          
54 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006). 
55 See U.S. FDA, Drugs: Development & Approval Process (Drugs): How Drugs Are Developed 
and Approved, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
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SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm (last visited July 21, 
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warnings.
63
 
Although the CDER asserts that it “continues to facilitate development 
of new drugs and new uses for already-approved drugs,” in 2002 the 
approval of truly new drugs was at its lowest level in a decade.
64
  In 
response to these figures, the Center took steps “to remove barriers to 
innovation in drug development and to facilitate the modernization of 
American drug manufacturing” by launching new initiatives.65  
Specifically in the area of cancer drug approvals, the FDA’s Office of 
Oncology Drug Products “is committed to facilitating rapid development, 
review, and action on promising new cancer therapies . . . [providing] the 
basis for accelerating introduction of new treatments for cancer into 
practice.”66  The FDA also recognizes that “[s]peeding the development 
and availability of drugs that treat serious diseases benefits everyone, 
especially when the drugs are the first available treatment or have 
advantages over existing treatments.”67 
The FDA is mindful of the fact that it can take a long time—often 
years—to study a new drug and discover whether it provides a real benefit, 
such as living longer or feeling better.
68
  Thus for certain serious or life-
threatening diseases, the FDA has the power to grant accelerated approval 
for a drug under the Accelerated Approval regulation, which allows for 
drugs that treat serious diseases to receive earlier approval, based on a 
“surrogate endpoint.”69  Post marketing clinical trials must then verify the 
predicted clinical benefit for the FDA to grant traditional approval for the 
drug.
70
  By using the surrogate, the drug’s approval process can be 
shortened considerably, saving valuable time instead of waiting to learn if 
a drug actually extends one’s survival.71  If the confirmatory trial does not 
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considerably shorten the time required prior to receiving FDA approval.”  Id. 
70 Id. 
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show the drug provides a clinical benefit, the FDA can then remove the 
drug from the market under its regulatory procedures.
72
 
The FDA has several policies and procedures that give the public the 
impression that it is dedicated to medical progress, such as the accelerated 
approval process.  This commitment is particularly noteworthy in the 
FDA’s Office of Oncology, which helps oversee Avastin for breast cancer.  
The current discussion around Avastin seems to be contrary to the FDA’s 
philosophy, however, as its recent decision halts the development and 
manufacturing of Avastin for metastatic breast cancer.  The effect of the 
FDA’s decision ultimately is to hinder innovation in the development of 
this drug for that indication and cripple its manufacturing by Genentech.  
While the FDA claims to be justified in its reasons, this action is contrary 
to its advertised commitment to “facilitating rapid development, review, 
and action on promising new cancer therapies.”73 
III.  PROBLEMS RAISED BY FDA REGULATION OF AVASTIN 
A.  Limitations on Patient Autonomy and the Problem of Paternalism 
The principle of autonomy is one of self-rule or self-determination, 
which regards individuals as the sole and exclusive owners of their 
person.
74
  Put another way, autonomy allows an individual to use his or her 
body and natural faculties in ways that do not infringe on the autonomy or 
liberty of others.
75
  There has been a longstanding tension between 
individual autonomy and social control because a rigid adherence to the 
principle of autonomy inhibits the ability of the state to organize the 
provision of public goods.
76
  While government regulations deal with many 
public goods and common problems, the principle of autonomy influences 
“the decisions that individuals make over their own bodies” and has been 
used by patients to guide decisions regarding medical treatments, 
particularly in the area of life-threatening illnesses like metastatic breast 
cancer.
77
 
There are two components of patient autonomy: rejection and 
acceptance of medical treatment.  Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously 
described this principle nearly a century ago when he wrote: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
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to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a 
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in  
damages . . . .  This is true, except in cases of emergency 
where the patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to 
operate before consent can be obtained.
78
 
Individuals may use the principle of personal autonomy defensively to 
refuse medical treatment that others conclude will benefit them. By 
contrast, the offensive use of autonomy—or “the right to accept treatment 
with consent—has been widely rejected today.”79  As Professor Epstein 
observed, “[the] ability to reject treatment [is] in . . . tension with claims 
for modest paternalism on the ground that health, not [individual patient] 
autonomy, is the paramount social end.”80  While a mentally competent 
adult patient has a near absolute right to refuse treatment where there is no 
harm to others,
81
 no individual has a right to demand whatever medical 
treatment or drugs he wishes to receive.  The FDA must license a drug 
before it can be made available for general sale or use by the public.
82
  The 
distinction between the patient’s right to accept or reject treatment is what 
shapes the role of the FDA in American law today.
83
 
Respect for a patient’s autonomy in making medical decisions is a 
fundamental value in bioethics.  This is so because the field of bioethics 
developed alongside a conceptual shift away from paternalism and towards 
respect for patient autonomy as the center of the physician-patient 
relationship.
84
  One manifestation of the right to reject medical treatment 
was the rise of the doctrine of informed consent.  Today, decision-making 
power has shifted from physicians to patients, who obtain medical 
information to guide their decisions on what procedures to undergo, what 
risks to accept, and what pain to endure.
85
  This doctrine has longstanding 
roots found in the visions of autonomy articulated by political theorists: 
In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is 
necessary that general rules should for the most part be 
observed, in order that people may know what they have to 
expect; but in each person’s own concerns, his individual 
                                                                                                                          
78 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (citations omitted). 
79 Against Permititis, supra note 76, at 2. 
80 Of the FDA and IRBs, supra note 74, at 567. 
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172, 172 (2011). 
82 Against Permititis, supra note 76, at 2–3. 
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 2012] REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA  333 
spontaneity is entitled to free exercise.  Considerations to aid 
his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be 
offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he 
himself is the final judge.  All errors which he is likely to 
commit against advice and warning, are far out-weighed by 
the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they 
deem his good.
86
 
While informed consent promotes the second part of individual 
autonomy—the right to accept potentially harmful medical  
treatments—there is currently an uneven acceptance of this part of the 
autonomy principle that has manifested in the area of drug regulation.  
FDA regulation of Avastin is an example of this problem. 
It is argued herein that the FDA regulation of drugs restricts one’s 
personal liberty.  The FDA has the power to keep cancer drugs off the 
market, “thereby limiting the scope of autonomous choices” for individuals 
with this disease.
87
  The normal principles of individual autonomy do not 
apply until a drug makes it to the marketplace; no individual is entitled to 
use any drug unless the FDA has approved it for sale and distribution.
88
  
Once a drug enters the market, however, it may be used for any purpose for 
which it has not received FDA approval because the FDA does not have 
the power to regulate the practice of medicine.  The FDCA provides that 
the FDA does not have the authority to “limit or interfere with the 
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe” any medication that has 
received FDA approval.
89
  Such uses are considered “off-label” and are the 
only kind for which Avastin may be used to treat advanced breast cancer.
90
  
Although the FDCA allows a physician to prescribe Avastin for an off-
label use, the Act still prohibits drug manufacturing companies like 
Genentech from promoting Avastin for that purpose, which is illegal under 
the Act.
91
  The law even goes as far as to prevent drug companies from 
warning physicians and the public about any negative side effects of their 
products, in hopes that the warning will not be misconstrued as implied 
approval from the FDA to use the drug.
92
  Such regulations impair both 
patients and physicians from gathering the necessary information to make 
informed treatment decisions together. 
Arguably, patients have the right to determine their medical treatment 
based on the doctrine of informed consent.  Under this doctrine, a patient 
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should be able to choose his or her medical care “if given sufficient 
information to understand the consequences, risks and benefits, and 
alternatives to the chosen medical treatment.”93  But under present rules, 
informed consent is insufficient to allow the distribution of experimental 
drugs outside the clinical testing context; therefore, patients cannot choose 
to take a potentially life-saving drug like Avastindespite being fully 
informed of its consequences, risks, and the alternativessimply because 
the FDA has not approved it.
94
  The FDA’s response to criticisms of this 
policy is that they regulate drugs to protect the public.
95
  The FDA thus 
takes a paternalistic role when it chooses for patients whether the benefits 
of Avastin sufficiently outweigh the risks to justify its accessibility for 
their condition.  But such a paternalistic approach denies patient 
autonomy.
96
 
The FDA justifies its restrictive policies as necessary to ensure that a 
drug’s benefits outweigh its risks before granting approval for sale and 
distribution.  Some argue that the FDA goes too far when it errs on the side 
of safety in regulating drugs.
97
  One critic describes the FDA’s risk-adverse 
behavior: 
If [FDA officials] approve a drug and one person in a million 
dies of it, they get the blame.  But if they keep [the drug] off 
the market and a thousand people die for lack of it, they will 
still be seen as just doing their job, and groups . . . will still 
hail them for “protecting Americans from unsafe and 
ineffective drugs.”98 
For this reason, the FDA does not have an incentive to allow patients 
to take their chances with drugs like Avastin, but it has every incentive to 
deny patients access to the drug, even when the potential benefits to the 
individual are high.
99
  This directly conflicts with the central belief of the 
autonomy principle that competent individuals, with the advice of their 
families, friends, and professionals, can “make better decisions about their 
own health care than any government agency that seeks to protect them 
from their mistakes.”100 
The present debate in modern drug regulation centers on whether the 
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FDA should continue in its role as a public gatekeeper, or be given a more 
modest role where it merely certifies drugs like Avastin as “safe and 
effective.”101  This change would remove the FDA’s monopoly position 
over potentially life-saving cancer treatments, while maintaining its ability 
as an agency to provide advice on which drugs to use and which to 
avoid.
102
  The effect of such a change would be to inhibit government 
agencies from blocking voluntary personal decisions.
103
  Although FDA 
regulations are directed at pharmaceutical companies like Genentech, their 
effects are felt by the individuals who can no longer purchase and use 
drugs.  The FDA thus substitutes its own judgment for that of individuals 
when it prevents them from assuming the risks of certain treatments in the 
hopes of receiving some health benefit.
104
 
Why should the FDA not loosen its controls on the initial licensing, 
marketing, and use of drugs like Avastin to encourage the sharing of 
information between drug manufacturers, physicians, and patients?  This 
would in turn speed up the process by which more and improved drugs 
enter the market.
105
  The FDA should not be able to ban drugs, but should 
instead be in the business of warning consumers.  This is because banning 
drugs requires the FDA to make judgments about risks and benefits that 
apply to everyone, regardless of individual circumstances.
106
  The 
government should not be in the business of life and death decisions; rather 
citizens, as autonomous individuals, should be free to make treatment 
decisions for themselves.
107
  Individuals’ autonomy rights should be given 
the same level of respect whether they are requesting or rejecting treatment 
because the FDA cannot determine the odds of health benefits better than 
individual patients equipped with their physician’s advice.108 
The challenge to individual autonomy and problem of paternalism that 
is raised by FDA regulation of cancer drugs suggest that the current system 
is inadequate for the regulation of Avastin.  American Cancer Society 
statistics show that despite widespread use of the proven therapies of 
surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, and hormone therapy, 1,500 people will 
die of cancer every day.
109
  The FDA’s current policy objective is to 
guarantee that cancer sufferers only employ so-called “proven methods” of 
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treatment and are not tricked into using non-approved drugs that can be 
potentially dangerous.
110
  As former Senator Bob Dole stated, “In a free 
market system, it seems to make sense to make available non-harmful 
alternative medical treatments to individuals who desire such treatments, 
without the Federal Government standing in the way.”111  There seems to 
be an inherent injustice in denying cancer patients the medical liberty to 
attempt to save their own lives.  To promote autonomy and justice for 
individuals, the current system needs to be modified so the FDA no longer 
has sole regulatory power over Avastin and other cancer drugs.
112
 
B.  The Health Care Rationing Debate 
Historically, the three pillars of comprehensive health care reform have 
been access, quality, and cost.  Current health reform politics have focused 
on cost by framing the issue as “getting good value for the money 
spent.”113  Rationing has always been present in the health care system.  
Some rationing is inevitable because of limited resources; it is reasonable 
to manage collective resources when most people believe that there is no 
benefit of a certain treatment.
114
  Bioethicists argue that when the judgment 
that a treatment provides no benefit is not unanimous, the denial of care 
results not from the elimination of harmful care, but from rationing.
115
  A 
claim of government rationing is thus raised when the FDA claims Avastin 
does not provide a health benefit to women with metastatic breast cancer, 
while women who suffer from the disease advocate that it could provide a 
benefit in their individual case. 
Rationing has been defined as a “method of allocating resources.”116  
This definition, however, does not reflect the way in which the term is 
currently used by health reformers.  Today, the use of the term in politics 
refers to some type of patient harm that occurs by denying resources to 
patients.
117
  Claims that rationing is taking place in “death panels” are hotly 
debated today.
118
  As one scholar put it: 
The current clinical and political fears about rationing are 
that efforts to slow the rate of growth in health care 
expenditures will harm patients.  Under this scenario, 
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rationing need not be explicit . . . .  Should rationing occur, it 
is likely to be from inaction without the fingerprints of any 
specific actor . . . with myriad effects on different 
populations.
119
   
Such rationing can be seen in the FDA’s decision to deny approval of 
Avastin for breast cancer. 
Rationing can be described as both “explicit” and “implicit.”  Implicit 
rationing is a result of government accident or inaction, while explicit 
rationing occurs by design.
120
  When the government acts in a way that 
prevents a medical care transaction from taking place that otherwise would 
have, it generates harm to a patient.
121
  There is, therefore, the potential for 
patient harm under both explicit and implicit rationing when cost is a factor 
in denying treatment.
122
  Some consider the denial of insurance payment 
for Avastin to be rationing under this view.
123
  The FDA, in denying 
approval of Avastin for the breast cancer indication, effectively gives 
insurance companies reason to deny payment for this treatment option.  
Women are then forced to pay for this costly drug out-of-pocket, inhibiting 
the medical care transaction that would have occurred from taking place 
for all but a select few who can afford it.   
By contrast, some do not consider this rationing because they do not 
agree there is patient harm in denying a treatment that has failed to show 
definitive net benefits in clinical trials.
124
  Under this view, rationing is 
achieved explicitly by price.  Insurance payors effectively tell patients 
“[y]ou want [Avastin] for your breast cancer, but this insurance plan does 
not cover an ineffective and potentially harmful drug.”125  Without proven 
health benefits, these individuals do not see this as creating patient harm, 
which they consider necessary for rationing to occur.
126
 
The flaw in this reasoning is that it associates the requisite patient 
harm needed for rationing to occur with a denial of the benefits of a 
treatment.  Since no benefits have been proven in clinical trials, denial of 
insurance payment for Avastin is not rationing in their eyes.
127
  The group 
that views the FDA decision as rationing is correct, however, when one 
considers that the actual patient harm in this instance is not the denial of a 
treatment with unknown or unproven benefits, but rather the denial of the 
autonomous decision of the patient to assume the risk of taking Avastin to 
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pursue a chance at survival. 
By removing its approval of Avastin, the FDA is engaging in implicit 
rationing and furthering the occurrence of explicit rationing by insurance 
companies.  Denial of approval for Avastin is implicit rationing because 
the FDA’s inaction in not approving the drug for breast cancer affects 
those whose insurance will in turn refuse to cover treatment payments.  
The FDA additionally incentivizes insurance payers to engage in rationing 
when a patient wants to take Avastin off-label to treat her breast cancer, 
but her insurance plan “does not cover an ineffective and potentially 
harmful drug.”128 
Private insurers are forced to ration care because they have limited 
resources in a society of virtually boundless demand.  No private insurer 
can survive without engaging in rationing because “[t]he essence of 
[managed care] is that salaries and profits are limited by the [managed care 
organization’s] fixed membership fees.”129  As one scholar noted, “[t]he 
problem of [a] fixed revenue” stream is further exacerbated by “failure to 
effectively address limitless demand.”130  As a result, private insurers 
attempt to coerce physicians into limiting the treatment options they make 
available to their patients.
131
  Government and private insurers who cannot 
afford to pay high prices for treatments are thus in constant conflict with 
patients who desire to consume expensive care.
132
  The government and 
insurers need to develop alternative approaches to rationing that 
incorporate greater process for those who are denied access to medical 
care, since rationing restricts the individual’s liberty interest of being able 
to choose any treatment option for one’s condition. 
Because the United States is a market-based system, rationing is 
achieved primarily by allocating resources like Avastin to those who are 
most willing to pay.
133
  This effectively forces those who are unable to pay 
the high price of these treatments out of the market, denying them access to 
the drugs they need.  Rationing by price is an effective means of rationing 
medical care because it excludes individuals from participating in market 
transactions, but limits consumption against the patient’s will.134 
A better method of rationing is rationing by quantity, which focuses on 
limiting access to treatments like Avastin over time.  Under this system, 
the government or private insurers set limits on an individual’s access to 
care options “by artificially limiting the quantity of that care available for 
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consumption.”135  Price rationing permits the wealthy to have access to 
drugs that may have little benefit to them relative to their cost while 
denying the poor this same option.  A system of rationing by quantity, 
however, gives preferential treatment to procedures that maximize public 
health relative to their costs.
136
  Under this form of rationing, the 
government sets clear limits on the amount of consumption per individual 
without engaging in a cost effectiveness analysis.
137
  This system reflects 
the value underlying recent health care legislation that all individuals 
should have access to health care, not just those who can afford it.  
FDA approval of Avastin for the breast cancer indication would not 
result in wasteful spending by insurance payers in a quantity rationing 
system because insurance payers could still place limits on the amount of 
treatment available per individual.  In a price-rationing system, medical 
allocations are effected by the government, resulting in reduced 
consumption of health care by those with insufficient insurance.  By 
contrast, quantity rationing occurs when the private sector sets limits on an 
individual’s access to high-cost drugs like Avastin “by artificially limiting 
the quantity of . . . care available for consumption.”138  Quantity rationing 
is thus more justified than price rationing by “controlling total 
expenditures” rather than “excluding a class of individuals from coverage 
entirely.”139  
Many scholars have theorized about whether all members of society 
should have access to “very expensive life-extending care at the end of 
life.”140  Avastin, which costs up to $90,000 per treatment, is estimated to 
add “only an additional 1.5 months” to one’s life expectancy, making it 
cost approximately $720,000 per year of life.
141
  This high cost raises the 
question of whether medical spending at the end of life is justified or 
should be viewed as “unconstrained.”142  A moral dilemma is raised as to 
what a “just” and “caring” society ought to do when we have the medical 
technology that can add time to an individual’s life, “but that technology is 
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not affordable to [those] who [require] that care.”143  As one scholar asked, 
“[a]re we morally obligated as a just and caring society to provide access at 
social expense to these cancer drugs for all these terminally ill cancer 
patients?  How high a priority (morally speaking) ought funding these 
drugs have . . . ?”144 
We should not accept the view that “we [have a moral obligation] to 
spend any amount of money to save all lives or life-years that medical 
technology permits.”145  This would not be just or compassionate in a 
society of limited resources that needs “to meet virtually unlimited health 
care needs.”146  But this does not mean that patients do not have a right to 
the health care treatments they need.  It is not immoral to ration the health 
care that society provides to terminally ill patients.
147
  But since the need 
for health care rationing cannot be avoided, “it is morally better [for 
society] that [these] decisions be visible and rationally self-imposed,” 
rather than imposed by the FDA.  It is better for society to make these 
decisions using “rational and fair processes of democratic deliberation.”148 
There are certain limits to patient autonomy.  It is undisputed that there 
is an ethical difference between refusing and demanding  
treatment—individuals do not have “unlimited choice [to receive care] at 
the expense of other[s].”149  But the problem of rationing arises when the 
FDA substitutes its judgment for that of the public in determining what 
standard of care should be available to all.  Since individual values and 
preferences differ, society needs to develop a consensus and compromise 
on what options to provide under a “cost-conscious standard of care.”150  
There is no definitive substantive standard to settle the conflicting 
judgments about whether certain treatments are sufficiently cost-worthy to 
be covered by insurance.
151
  A fair process would consider insurance 
coverage in light of a drug’s effectiveness and expense.152  These processes 
should be “fair,” “open,” and allow decision makers “to hear the case for 
all [the different] views.”153 
Society should not let “the emotional power and sympathy that 
surrounds . . . the end of life” or “the insurance effect” cause it to place a 
high value on “all demands and desires for life extending care at the end of 
                                                                                                                          
143 Fleck, supra note 140, at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
144 Id. at 161.  
145 Id. at 162. 
146 Id. at 156, 162. 
147 Id. at 156. 
148 Id. at 156–57. 
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life.”154  Rationing decisions are more legitimate when it is acknowledged 
that terminally ill patients “represent our future possible selves,” and 
decisions are “public” and “self-imposed.”155  To achieve “fair rationing,” 
society should deliberate through the democratic process, instead of blindly 
relying on the FDA’s licensing decisions to determine rationing 
outcomes.
156
  The FDA is therefore not the proper agency to be regulating 
drugs like Avastin. 
C.  Costly Information and Burdens on Physicians 
The FDA’s decision to remove its approval of Avastin to treat 
metastatic breast cancer results in reduced use of Avastin for that 
indication because physicians now must prescribe the drug off-label to the 
patients that desire this treatment option.  While no law prohibits 
physicians from prescribing drugs off-label, “drug manufacturers may not 
[legally] promote their products for off-label uses.”157  Such a ban on off-
label promotion raises social policy concerns as it increases the costs of 
drug development, slows down the rate of adopting effective new uses of 
Avastin for serious diseases, and limits the ability of patients and 
prescribing physicians to receive useful medical information from drug 
developers like Genentech.
158
 
Off-label uses of drugs are both widespread and beneficial in modern 
medicine.  Such use occurs when a physician prescribes a pharmaceutical 
product at a dose and/or for a condition that the FDA has either not 
reviewed or not approved.
159
  Manufacturers are regulated in the type of 
promotion for off-label uses they are permitted to engage in because off-
label drug use imposes enhanced risks without proven benefits.
160
  So 
while the FDA cannot restrict physicians from prescribing drugs like 
Avastin to their patients off-label, they do have the authority to forbid drug 
companies from promoting their drugs for off-label purposes.
161
  The 
FDCA does not address the practice of off-label promotion; however, the 
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155 Fleck, supra note 140, at 168. 
156 Id. 
157 John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-
Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 305 (2010) 
(emphasis omitted).  As a result of the FDA’s decision, “any language discussing a metastatic breast 
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Answers: Removing Metastatic Breast Cancer as an Indication from Avastin’s Product Labeling, U.S. 
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161 Id. at 227. 
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FDA considers off-label promotion to be violative of the part of the Act 
that bans pharmaceutical manufacturers from introducing a new drug into 
interstate commerce unless it has received FDA approval.
162
 
When a drug label is based on clinical studies for specific indications, 
the possibility that the drug may work in other clinical situations is high; 
this is why off-label application is among the most prevalent in the 
treatment of cancer.
163
  Off-label applications of cancer drugs have been 
called “the hallmark of state-of-the-art treatment.”164  The National Cancer 
Institute and many publications encourage off-label use of cancer drugs as 
being reasonable, particularly in the cases of rare cancers where there is no 
existing treatment and when there is substantial evidence, but no FDA 
approval.
165
  In instances where off-label use benefits patients, “off-label 
marketing [and promotion] may enable the greatest number of potential 
beneficiaries to [learn about the treatments that are] best suited to their 
needs.”166 
There are circumstances where off-label use to treat certain cancers is 
evidence-based.  Sometimes, off-label use arises from post-marketing 
studies as physicians experiment with the drug after it is approved for the 
original indication.
167
  If additional efficacy is shown, the drug label can be 
modified to reflect the new indication if the manufacturer submits a formal 
application to the FDA that justifies the new use with data.
168
  Gaining 
FDA approval requires companies to invest in gathering evidence and 
conducting clinical trials, a process that involves significant cost and 
time.
169
  Drug companies who fear that a bad review from the FDA will 
negatively affect their on-label prescription sales may be dissuaded from 
engaging in the process at all.
170
  Even off-label uses that could generate a 
lot of revenue may not be pursued if the manufacturer does not want to risk 
these adverse effects.  Such fears demonstrate that many off-label uses may 
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163 Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An 
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 193 (1999).  But, if a 
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164 Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
165 Kesselheim, supra note 159, at 235. 
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169 Id.  “The administrative process at the FDA can take many months.”  Id.; see also Salbu, supra 
note 163, at 188 (“‘[T]he manufacturer of a drug with potential multiple uses confronts the prospect of 
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170 Kesselheim, supra note 159, at 237. 
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be beneficial even where they have not gained FDA approval.
171
 
The FDA’s policies are restrictive of drug companies like Genentech 
who need to promote their products directly to physicians and to patients in 
order to spur increased use of their products.
172
  A competitive market 
prompts manufacturers to initiate increased patient and physician use of 
their products to recover their costs of R&D and generate revenue for 
further development.  Increased revenue gives manufacturers the ability 
not just to discover new drugs, but to develop those already present in the 
market for other indications as a way of promoting efficient development.  
Discussing their products with patients and physicians gives companies the 
ability to see how their products affect patients for these other uses, 
thereby reducing the costs of conducting additional clinical trials.  Such 
work is desirable for patients who require a reactive and constantly 
improving drug market to treat their ever-changing needs. 
Drug manufacturers fund the R&D of new drugs through high drug 
prices.
173
  In order to offset the high costs of R&D and to generate funding 
to develop new drugs, drug manufacturers have an incentive to develop 
“‘blockbuster’” drugs with high annual sales.174  Biotechnology 
pharmaceutical companies are relatively new to the pharmaceutical 
industry, but experience the same challenges in researching and developing 
new drugs.
175
  It has been estimated that the American biotechnology drug 
market exceeds $60 billion annually.
176
  However, this industry is 
perceived as dangerous for investors because many of these companies 
struggle to be profitable after they invest millions in researching new 
drugs.
177
 
The regulations imposed by the FDA are aimed at preventing drug 
companies from promoting unapproved uses of their products, as such uses 
 
                                                                                                                          
171 Id.  Other examples where off-label use may be reasonable and beneficial are in cases where it 
is difficult to collect evidence.   
For example, narrowly-defined populations including very young children, high-risk 
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173 Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access and 
Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010). 
174 Id. at 324. 
175 See id. at 324, 328. 
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may be dangerous or not based on complete evidence demonstrating 
efficacy.
178
  The FDA has a legitimate, compelling interest in protecting 
the public health with off-label prescribing by ensuring that companies do 
not transmit false or misleading information or encourage such prescribing 
without an underlying medical basis.
179
  Drug manufacturers should not be 
prohibited from promoting off-label use if the use is then “demonstrated to 
be scientifically reasonable through federal[] . . . research.”180  Efficacy 
information for new drug approval is gathered in a very condition-specific 
process that results in a FDA decision on whether a drug is not just 
efficacious or safe enough to be allowed on the market, but whether these 
elements justify approval for the drug’s intended use.181  This evidence is 
gathered in adequate and well-controlled studies.
182
 
The FDA approved Avastin to treat patients with metastatic carcinoma 
of the colon or rectum in 2004, and to treat colon or rectal cancer and non-
small cell lung cancer in 2006.
183
  In 2007, one scientist experimented with 
a modified form of Avastin to treat neovascular age-related macular 
degeneration, a disorder of the retina causing vision loss.
184
  Following this 
off-label experimentation, Genentech was uncertain of how to 
communicate with physicians about the off-label use.
185
  From 2004 to 
2007, Genentech struggled with their position as interest in the off-label 
use of Avastin increased, but the company did not know whether it could 
lawfully communicate with physicians regarding the safety information of 
the off-label use.
186
  This is because the FDA’s interest in protecting the 
public health empowers it to prevent companies from transmitting false or 
misleading information and encouraging off-label prescribing of drugs at 
the risk of civil or criminal liability.
187
 
The problem this example illustrates is that the FDA does not consider 
whether or not scientific and medical information provided by a drug 
company is truthful and not misleading, or whether or not physicians 
prescribe a drug in a medically appropriate manner; the FDA is only 
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 2012] REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA  345 
concerned with whether the indication in question has been approved.  If it 
has not, and a company like Genentech communicates or conveys 
information to physicians on an unapproved indication, then the FDA will 
conduct an investigation and prosecute the company.
188
  It is unclear under 
what circumstances a manufacturer will be permitted to express an opinion 
on off-label uses of its products without being subject to a billion-dollar 
investigation.
189
  Drug manufacturers should be able to communicate 
truthful, non-misleading scientific and medical information that comports 
with sound medical practice.
190
 
Restricting off-label marketing ends a potential source of cost-
containment.  By subjecting all potential uses of a drug to FDA approval, 
the number of clinical trials conducted is increased, as well as the amount 
spent in R&D expenses.
191
  These costs are then passed to consumers 
through price increases, making treatments even more difficult to obtain.
192
  
These resources could be saved or more appropriately used by the FDA if 
off-label treatments could be marketed without seeking FDA approval.  By 
focusing instead on expediting approval of new drugs, the amount of 
money spent by the FDA could be reduced or spent processing new drug 
applications more quickly, benefiting consumers by expediting patient 
access to new treatments.
193
 
Knowledge is more readily collected and shared within the scientific 
and medical community without FDA intervention.  Patients expect their 
physician to have the ability to learn of the most current scientifically valid 
information and incorporate it into the way they treat their patients.
194
  
Manufactures are in the best position to keep physicians informed about 
the latest research findings that encourage “new and beneficial off-label 
uses of their products.”195  Patients deserve to receive “better, potentially 
life-saving treatments before the completion of the lengthy approval 
process.”196  In fact, drug companies frame the issue of off-label marketing 
in terms of whether they should be denied the freedom to provide doctors 
with “truthful information.”197  The result of the FDA’s policies is that 
doctors and other health care providers may not be adequately informed.  If 
the risks of treatment are clearly disclosed, reduced regulation by the FDA 
would increase social utility and benefit patients. 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO FDA REGULATION 
The FDA has a policy “to ensure that cancer sufferers only employ the 
so-called ‘proven methods’ and are not deceived into using non-approved 
therapies that can be [totally] ineffective and potentially dangerous.”198  
However, this removes a patient’s autonomy to select a potentially  
life-saving treatment option, rations care through insurance companies’ 
denial of coverage for these treatments, increases costs of drugs to patients 
and of development to manufacturers, and reduces the information 
available to physicians to help their patients make informed decisions.  
Together, these problems indicate that the current system is inadequate and 
an alternative system of regulation for cancer drugs like Avastin should be 
implemented. 
The FDA should no longer serve as a public gatekeeper for new cancer 
treatments, but should instead have the role of certifying these products as 
“safe and effective.”199  They should no longer have control of the 
licensing of cancer drugs, but should act as a certification agency that 
offers advice on which drugs to use and which to avoid.
200
  Once initial 
clinical trials have been completed, patients and physicians should have the 
ability to choose a drug.
201
  This would not only promote individual patient 
autonomy, but would also reduce fraud in the drug market.  By denying 
approval for Avastin, the price of Avastin skyrockets for those without 
insurance to cover its cost.  This in turn permits those producing 
counterfeit Avastin to have a market for their products, which are more 
affordable to those paying out-of-packet.  Such was the case where fake 
Avastin made it to the U.S. market in February, shortly after the approval 
for Avastin was removed by the FDA.
202
 
The FDA should protect the public from treatments that have not 
passed any clinical trials, but should not be responsible for denying 
approval for drugs where it lacks the individualized calculation of whether 
patients have risk factors for particular treatments.
203
  Three alternative 
systems that could effectively regulate Avastin include: (1) shared decision 
making by patients and physicians; (2) regulation by private organizations; 
and (3) indirect regulation by insurance payors. 
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A.  Shared Decision Making 
The first way that Avastin could be regulated subsequent to modifying 
the FDA’s role from regulation to certification is through a process of 
shared decision making by patients and physicians.  Experts have called 
shared decision making the “ideal model of treatment decision making in 
the medical [context].”204  Shared decision making reduces the imbalance 
between physicians and patients by increasing the information patients 
receive as well as their sense of having authority and control over their 
own treatment decisions.
205
  Support for shared decision making has risen 
as a result of informed consent being considered a patient right, the 
principle of informed choice gaining support, the consumer rights 
movement, and the changing nature of the medical practice from one of 
acute care to one of chronic care.
206
 
Shared decision making is a process that occurs between a physician 
and patient, where both parties take steps to participate in the process of 
choosing a treatment.
207
  Essentially, both parties engage in information 
and value sharing and ultimately both parties agree on the final treatment 
decision.
208
  Physicians and patients participate in the treatment decision 
making process when they take several steps: first, the physician 
establishes a conducive atmosphere for the patient to feel their views about 
different treatment options are valued and needed; second, the physician 
elicits the patient’s preferences so that the treatment options considered 
comport with their values; third, the physician explains the various 
treatment options, risks, and benefits to the patient in a clear and unbiased 
fashion; fourth, physicians help patients weigh the risks and benefits of 
each option and make sure the information they are basing their opinions 
on is accurate; and finally, the physician participates in the decision 
making by sharing his treatment recommendation and affirming the 
patient’s treatment decision.209 
The practice of medicine has changed over the last two to three 
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decades, resulting in a shift to physicians managing illnesses instead of 
curing diseases.
210
  In these instances, the physician-patient relationship 
can potentially last for many years or even a lifetime.  The changing nature 
of the practice of medicine requires that physicians now work closely with 
patients to choose the best drugs to treat their individual condition.
211
  This 
process takes time, continuous monitoring, and adjustment of drug types 
and levels.  For life-threatening conditions such as cancer, this process is 
thought to work best if both patients and physicians participate in key 
treatment decision points and selecting medication regimens, as the wrong 
decision may result in severe consequences for the patient.
212
  Since the 
choice of the best treatment for a particular patient requires value 
judgments, this decision is best made by patients and physicians. 
The current problem is that a physician’s experience, knowledge and 
expertise can be trumped by the FDA when they do not approve treatments 
like Avastin for new conditions.
213
  A physician who has used a drug like 
Avastin becomes an expert on its application and use, even where the 
treatment is new and not routinely used.
214
  One attorney made the case 
against FDA bureaucrats when he said, “Your physician may recommend 
an experimental drug, the corporate sponsor of that drug may agree to 
supply it, and the clinical investigator may agree to administer it, but if the 
FDA disagrees, you are out of luck.”215  Not all persons with cancer have 
the same circumstances surrounding their condition.  It is therefore 
inappropriate for the FDA to choose the best cancer treatment for 
individuals because they are unaware of an individual’s unique medical 
history.
216
 
The FDA takes the position that cancer patients may choose a harmful 
treatment or receive a harmful batch of medicine and therefore they must 
be protected from making wrong decisions; but this argument ignores the 
fact that a patient’s physician is the best medical decision maker to assist 
individuals in these choices.
217
  A physician may not be able to monitor 
drug production and distribution, but physicians are trained and licensed to 
give diagnostic and therapeutic assistance to their patients.  Why then 
should a paternalistic government stand in the way of them rendering the 
best advice and treatments for their patient’s needs?  Patients should have 
the ability not just to choose their physician, but to expect that their 
physician will use his best judgment to help them choose the optimal 
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treatment for their particular needs.
218
  There is no evidence that patients 
and physicians are more likely than the FDA to make mistakes if their 
cancer options go beyond surgery, radiation, chemotherapy and hormone 
therapy.
219
 
It is often the case that a patient with advanced cancer is willing to try 
any treatment, no matter what risks are involved, as a last ditch effort to try 
and save her own life.  It makes sense for us to have a procedure in place 
for these patients to exercise their right to take on any risk to try and save 
their lives.  Once a physician determines that a patient has reached a point 
in her disease where traditional treatments will be fruitless and she will 
otherwise die from her cancer, that physician should be able to prescribe 
Avastin so long as the patient is fully informed of all the risks involved.  
The FDA should clear the prescription of Avastin for such cases and 
permit issuance of the drug to those who have consented to the risks.  The 
FDA could label the drug with these risks and as not having full approval.  
This would maintain the FDA’s role as a protector of public health while 
promoting complete patient autonomy and informed consent. 
Shared decision making can also be achieved through a bill like the 
Access to Medical Treatment Act (“AMTA”).220  This bill, if passed, 
would “permit an individual to be treated by a health care practitioner with 
any method of medical treatment such individual requests, and for other 
purposes.”221  It would give the individual the right to be treated with 
medical treatments that are not approved, certified, or licensed by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services.
222
  It would allow cancer 
sufferers to choose the most appropriate medical treatment for their 
condition with the help of their physician.
223
  However, AMTA will not be 
passed so long as the FDA is permitted to trump the medical decisions of a 
patient’s physician where cancer treatments are not “proven” by the 
FDA.
224
 
AMTA takes a liberal approach to drug regulation by focusing on 
patient autonomy rather than FDA paternalism.  If passed, it would allow 
cancer patients to consult with their physicians to discuss a variety of 
medical treatments, including Avastin.
225
  Under AMTA, a patient could 
                                                                                                                          
218 Id. at 710. 
219 Id.  “Even if one were to assume that the FDA was in the best position to make medical 
decisions for everyone, the FDA cannot play the role of physician to the half million cancer patients 
who will die this year.”  Id. 
220 H.R. 2736, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter AMTA]. 
221 Id. 
222 H.R. 2736Access to Medical Treatment Act: Official Summary, OPENCONGRESS, 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h2736/show (last visited July 21, 2012). 
223 Horwin, supra note 109, at 696. 
224 Id. 
225 See Brady, supra note 93, at 411 (contrasting the paternalistic approach of the FDA with the 
liberal approach of AMTA in the area of drug regulation). 
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receive a treatment so long as a physician had no reason to conclude the 
treatment was dangerous to the patient.  This would permit a patient to 
receive a treatment like Avastin in the early stages of development or 
before it underwent any clinical trials if the patient was fully informed and 
provided consent.
226
  This would dramatically increase patient autonomy 
under the FDA, making shared decision making possible for those 
suffering from cancer. 
AMTA would also allow drug manufacturers to market drugs directly 
to patients and physicians without FDA approval.
227
  Drugs would still be 
regulated, but this would be accomplished by physicians, tort liability, and 
market factors, rather than by the FDA.
228
  Physicians would take on an 
increased role in protecting their patients from harmful drugs and 
treatments by becoming informed of the alternatives and shielding their 
patients from harmful drugs.
229
  Patients could also use the tort system 
against manufacturers who put out harmful products and against doctors 
who breached the standard of medical care.
230
  Lastly, the drug market 
would regulate manufacturers as harmful or ineffective drugs would not be 
profitable and would be forced out by drugs that are more effective.
231
 
The FDA is ill-suited to regulate cancer drugs like Avastin because of 
the threat raised to patient autonomy.   While shared decision making is but 
one alternative to the current system, it is a preferable one because it 
allows patients and physicians to evaluate individual circumstances and 
make informed choices about the best possible treatments, something the 
FDA does not have the knowledge or resources to do. 
B.  Voluntary Private Organizations 
Another way to regulate cancer drugs like Avastin is through voluntary 
private organizations.  This type of system is favored by those holding a 
presumption against the use of government power to regulate autonomous 
individuals.
232
  The government must justify asserting power over 
individual decisions where a loss of personal liberty is involved.  This 
burden is met where the government is trying to prevent harms that 
individuals may inflict on others; however, the threshold to justify 
government action is higher where the potential harm of an individual’s 
decision is to himself.
233
  If one starts with a strong presumption against 
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government regulation of autonomous decisions, the FDA does not have a 
sufficient reason to overcome the liberty interest of individuals in choosing 
for themselves the best treatment option. 
 Following this presumption, government coercion is not justified in 
the cancer context, where private groups can process information more 
efficiently for consumers at lower costs than the FDA.
234
  Professional 
intermediaries already administer cancer drugs, even with the FDA in 
place as a public gatekeeper.
235
  Voluntary methods of regulating cancer 
drugs will be more successful than the FDA because “[d]ecentralized 
bodies are more likely to make sound[] decisions.”236  The FDA is inferior 
to the private systems already in place, and such systems can advance 
when drug companies are permitted to engage in the distribution of 
information created by independent sources, something currently 
prohibited.
237
 
Voluntary organizations that deal with oncology already exist; patients 
and physicians use them to connect to the manufacturers of cancer drugs.
238
  
Voluntary organizations are usually nonprofit organizations that “collect, 
digest, and interpret material for their members in areas where there is an 
information shortfall.”239  Physicians benefit from the information these 
organizations communicate and the best practice standards they set.
240
  
Private organizations compete to provide the best information.  Physicians 
may “use information from such organizations” and then “report their own 
experiences [with a drug] back” to the organization, allowing for an 
ongoing updating of information that physicians can compare.
241
  The FDA 
does not have a similar means of collecting and disseminating information; 
the fact that “the FDA lacks the resources [and] expertise . . . to evaluate 
cutting-edge . . . technologies” causes the regulatory power of the FDA to 
exceed its ability to discharge its obligations.
242
 
The FDA should grant accelerated regulatory approval for cancer 
drugs like Avastin, especially when they have demonstrated efficacy for 
other indications.  There should be reduced evidentiary requirements to 
justify certification from the FDA, which in turn would reduce the amount 
of money the FDA would have to spend.
243
  Such accelerated approval 
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should then be followed by post-approval monitoring by private 
organizations for adverse effects.  “[M]anufacturers would [then] have an 
accelerated pathway they could use to discuss [the benefits of the] off-label 
uses of their products” and disseminate information to consumers in need 
of life-saving therapies.
244
  Private organizations, unlike the FDA, have the 
resources to efficiently update information received from physicians using 
Avastin for off-label uses.  It is inefficient for the FDA to continue 
regulating where a private body can achieve the same, if not better, results. 
C.  Insurance Payors 
The last possibility for regulating Avastin subsequent to modifying the 
FDA’s role is through insurance payors.  Under current law, the FDA 
cannot prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs off-label.  Insurers, 
however, are able to discourage such applications by denying payment for 
these uses.
245
  Insurance plans dissuade physicians from prescribing off-
label drugs by requiring evidence of the use’s quality and efficacy before 
providing payment for that use.
246
  It is undisputed that some off-label 
prescribing can provide important benefits to patients.
247
  Since physicians 
have the ability to practice medicine according to their best medical 
judgment, “there are inherent risks attached to” the unregulated practice of 
off-label prescribing.
248
  If the private market can address these risks better 
than the government, then regulation should be left to the private market.  
This makes sense where “[t]he FDA has limited resources to monitor the 
11,000 drugs on the market,”249 let alone to regulate off-label applications. 
If necessary, states could influence off-label drug use by requiring 
insurers to pay for off-label uses of certain drugs for which they would 
normally deny coverage.  States also have the authority to ban off-label 
uses in their efforts to promote public health.
250
  Since the federal 
government is without authority in the practice of medicine, it does not 
make sense for the federal government to regulate off-label uses of drugs 
like Avastin.  A system is already in place for insurance payors to regulate 
this market indirectly by denying coverage for drugs that lack evidence of 
quality and efficacy, supplemented by the states’ authority to establish off-
label mandates in line with their policies.
251
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The best alternative to FDA regulation is a model that is flexible 
enough to allow physicians to prescribe drugs off-label where it is the best 
treatment for a patient’s condition, while containing the possibility of 
patient harm.
252
  Insurance payors, in their role as reimbursement agents, 
are capable of “discouraging harmful and non-beneficial off-label drug 
use” because they have an “incentive to eliminate unnecessary drug 
us[e].”253  Regulation at this level is achieved at a lower price because 
insurance payors already engage in this process.  Insurance payor 
regulation of cancer drugs is thus a solution that promotes the autonomy of 
patients and physicians in choosing drugs like Avastin when they are the 
optimal treatment, while decreasing the risk of patient harm by not 
reimbursing unnecessary drug usage. 
The effectiveness of the insurance payor as a regulator of drugs is 
undeniable.  Physicians already make off-label prescribing decisions based 
on payor reimbursement decisions.
254
  If such a model already induces 
physicians to follow the standard of care, why should the government 
continue to regulate in this area?  FDA oversight is duplicative where 
insurance payor regulation can facilitate evidence-based medicine at lower 
costs.
255
  Most insurance payors require a showing of safety and efficacy 
for off-label drug use before providing reimbursement.  Almost all payors 
use medical evidence in these decisions.
256
  This alternative gives 
physicians and drug manufacturers a compelling interest in providing 
scientific evidence of a drug’s capabilities before prescribing it off-label.  
Those who did not produce such evidence would face the risk of non-
payment by insurance payors; such a prospect guides them in practicing 
evidence-based medicine so funds can be administered to them.
257
 
The FDA approval process for cancer drugs like Avastin has strict 
requirements and is incredibly costly.  The evidence required for payor 
reimbursement of off-label prescriptions is more relaxed than this process, 
but still guides medical decision making when physicians consider the 
safety of an off-label use and their chances of reimbursement.
258
  “In light 
of [insurance] payor’s reliance on [actual] medical evidence when making 
reimbursement decisions for off-label [uses],” the need for costly clinical 
trials is reduced, which in turn “lower[s] the cost of evidence-based off-
label prescribing.”259  This model not only reduces costs for an already 
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overburdened government agency, but creates the flexibility needed to 
achieve physician and patient autonomy in medical decision making. 
Once the federal government’s regulatory role is reduced and the 
private industry takes over the bulk of the regulation of cancer drugs, states 
can replace federal oversight where public health or policy issues are 
raised.  For example, states may choose to mandate private insurers to 
provide or deny coverage for off-label prescribing.  In this way, the 
government can prevent insurance companies from denying reimbursement 
for off-label uses that patients need to treat their medical conditions or can 
discourage off-label prescribing.
260
  According to one researcher, “[m]ore 
than thirty states [require] at least some [insurance] coverage for off-label 
uses of drugs.”261  Such mandates enable states to compel insurance payors 
to cover certain costs when their cost-containment policies would harm 
patient’s health needs.  This measure would protect against health care 
rationing because insurance payors would no longer rely on the decisions 
of the FDA to deny coverage for potentially life-saving treatments; rather, 
insurance payors would be held accountable by the states with an interest 
in and the ultimate authority to promote the health and safety of the 
population. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The FDA claims that it is “committed to providing early access to 
promising, but unproven, medical treatments for seriously ill patients who 
might otherwise have no hope.”262  However, the FDA contradicts itself 
when it states that no matter how compelling a case may be, “the cost of 
providing individual access [to care] cannot be to sacrifice the system that 
ultimately establishes whether therapies are safe and effective.”263  Such 
conflicting statements highlight the FDA’s limitations: it is incapable of 
accomplishing its goals of both promoting public health through innovative 
treatments and protecting people from unproven therapies.   
Since the FDA does not have sufficient resources to address both 
issues, it often fails in its first goal by sacrificing innovation and drug 
development to maintain the integrity of the agency.  By removing the 
FDA as the sole regulatory authority for the approval and licensing of 
cancer drugs like Avastin, this problem can be avoided.  The FDA 
continues to protect the public health by promoting drugs that pass Phase I 
clinical trials, but does not stand in the way of patient autonomy and drug 
development by engaging in subsequent approval of cancer drugs for all 
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potential uses.  More responsibility will be placed on patients who desire 
these treatments and the physicians who gather the necessary information 
to prescribe them.  This is desirable in a country based on the democratic 
principle of free choice. 
Although the FDA has an important role as a protector of the health 
and safety of the public at large, the solution proposed by this Note does 
not detract from this role nor does it challenge FDA authority in its 
traditional areas of regulation.  This proposal merely recognizes that in an 
era where rapid development of new and promising drug therapies is 
prevalent, the FDA does not have adequate resources to keep up.  This role 
should properly be transferred to patients, physicians, voluntary 
organizations, and insurance payors who can better bear the burden of 
information gathering, engaging in public discourse/debate, disseminating 
test results, and holding drug manufacturers accountable for the products 
they send into the market.  For these reasons, Congress should modify the 
role of the FDA and allow the market to take control in the regulation of 
cancer drugs like Avastin. 
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